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ABSTRACT
This paper compares financial assistance programmes of four euro-area countries 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus) and three non-euro-area countries 
(Hungary, Latvia, and Romania) of the European Union in the aftermath of the 
2007/08 global financial and economic crisis—which were supported by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and various European financing facilities. 
These programmes have distinct features compared with assistance programmes 
in other parts of the world, such as the size of imbalances, financing, unique 
cooperation of the IMF and various European facilities, and membership of a 
currency union in the case of euro-area countries. We evaluate the programmes 
by assessing their success in creating conditions to regain market access, the 
degree of compliance with loan conditionality, and actual economic performance 
relative to programme assumptions. We conclude that the rate of compliance 
with loan conditionality was not a good predictor of programme success and 
that deviations from gross domestic product programme assumption correlate 
strongly with fiscal performance and unemployment, highlighting the key role of 
macroeconomic projections in programme design. While the Troika institutions 
succeeded in cooperating, there were major disputes among them in some cases, 
especially related to the assessment of fiscal sustainability and cross-country 
spillovers. Asian countries can draw several lessons from European experiences, 
including the coexistence of the IMF and regional safety nets, cooperation issues, 
systemic spillovers, and social implications of programme design.
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1. Introduction 
The recent global financial and economic crisis, which started to develop in summer 2007 in 
the United States (US), shocked Europe. After the September 2008 collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, one of the top-five US investment banks, several European Union (EU) countries 
had to ask for financial assistance one after the other.  
Three non-euro-area countries—Hungary, Latvia, and Romania—were the first victims of the 
crisis in the EU, requesting financial assistance shortly after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. Assistance to these countries were provided jointly by the EU medium-term 
financial assistance facility for non-euro-area EU countries and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), in partnership with the World Bank (for all three countries), European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (for Latvia and Romania), European Investment Bank (for 
Romania), and several countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway, 
Poland, and Sweden for Latvia).1 The total volume of lending was not extraordinary large, 
given the relatively small size of the public debt of these countries. 
Shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, euro-area member states seemed to be 
shielded from the crisis. In fact, in Denmark, an EU country that is not a member of the euro 
area but keeps a fixed exchange rate to the euro, the central bank had to raise interest rates 
to support the peg, while the European Central Bank (ECB) cut interest rates. Based on this 
development, many commentators applauded the good choice of euro-area members with 
weaker fundaments to join the euro earlier, which seemed to protect them from the global 
financial crisis. 
However, in the second half of 2009, tensions started to increase initially concerning Greece, 
and later concerning other peripheral euro-area countries too. There were general elections 
in Greece in 2009 and soon after it more information became available, indicating that the 
budget deficit of the country will be several factors higher than the 3.6 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) deficit initially planned. Actually, the Greek budget deficit became 
15.1 percent of GDP in 2009. In early 2010, there were intense discussions on whether a 
euro-area country could ask for financial assistance, and in particular, whether the IMF could 
participate in the bailout of a euro-area country.2 Moreover, the EU did not have a crisis 
management framework and an appropriate fund to help out a euro-area country. The EU 
medium-term financial assistance facility (which supported Hungary, Latvia, and Romania in 
2008–2009) was especially dedicated to non-euro-area countries.  
However, the blast of the financial crisis made it necessary to develop European financial 
assistance facilities for euro-area member states. Four euro countries requested full financial 
assistance programmes: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus. In addition, Spain requested 
a special banking programme from the EU. Since the 2010 Greek financial assistance 
programme tragically failed, the country negotiated a second assistance programme in 2012 
and, subsequently, a third one in 2015.  
The full-fledged financial assistance programmes of Greece in 2010 and in 2012, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Cyprus were under the auspices of the so-called “Troika”: the IMF, the 
                                                          
1 See Table 1 in Darvas (2009) for the contribution of the different lenders to these three financial assistance 
programs. 
2 See Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2010). 
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European Commission, and the ECB. These three institutions cooperated in the design, 
monitoring, and financing of the financial assistance programmes. 
At the time of writing this article, the IMF has not yet decided whether to participate in the 
third financial assistance programme of Greece, because of major disagreement between 
the IMF and European institutions on the sustainability of Greek public debt. 
What were the special aspects of euro-area and non-euro-area EU programmes? Were 
these programmes successful? What major tensions emerged between the IMF and 
European institutions? And what are the implications of the European experiences with 
cooperation with the IMF for regional financial assistance facilities in Asia? These questions 
are answered in this paper by comparing the four euro-area and three non-euro-area EU 
financial assistance countries and Germany, the largest EU country, which acts as an 
anchor in many aspects.  
 
2. The distinctive aspects of euro-area programmes 
Financial assistance programmes for euro-area countries had several distinctive features 
compared with other financial assistance programmes (see, for example, Pisani-Ferry et al. 
2013). We highlight six specific characteristics. Only a few of these features characterize the 
non-euro EU countries that received financial assistance. 
2.1 Large imbalances 
Very large imbalances were accumulated in the pre-crisis years. The current account deficit 
of several southern euro-area member states exceeded 10 percent of GDP (Figure 1). 
Similarly, high current account deficits were observed in a number of (non-euro area) central 
and eastern European EU countries. These large current account deficits made these 
countries vulnerable to a stop in private capital inflows. The consequence of persistently 
large current account deficits was the accumulation of a very large negative net foreign asset 
position, which increased to about 100 percent of GDP in peripheral euro-area countries and 
in Central and Eastern European countries. In the euro-area periphery, the net negative 
foreign asset position mostly comprised of debt liabilities (Table 1), while in Central and 
Eastern European countries, foreign direct investment (which is a more stable funding 
source) also had a significant role. It is also notable that Ireland and Cyprus, two financial 
centres, have huge gross foreign assets and liabilities relative to their GDP. 
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Figure 1: Current account balance (percent GDP) 
  
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Source: European Commission’s February 2017 AMECO database. 
 
Table 1: Gross and net international investment position, end-2009 (percent GDP)  
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Gross 
assets 
FDI 139 5 1 11 224 26 529 36 
PI equity 5 2 0 3 174 12 20 16 
PI debt 1 6 0 27 454 54 204 40 
OI 18 46 7 44 365 53 246 73 
Total 163 59 8 85 1,217 145 1,000 165 
Gross 
liabilities 
FDI -183 -35 -30 -11 -209 -42 -574 -27 
PI equity -9 -1 -1 -7 -380 -22 -11 -15 
PI debt -27 -4 -2 -73 -300 -75 -50 -54 
OI -63 -101 -40 -64 -410 -95 -449 -54 
Total -281 -141 -73 -155 -1,299 -236 -1,084 -150 
Net 
assets 
FDI -44 -30 -29 0 15 -16 -44 9 
PI equity -3 2 -1 -3 -206 -10 9 1 
PI debt -25 2 -2 -46 154 -21 154 -13 
OI -45 -55 -34 -21 -44 -43 -203 19 
Total -117 -82 -65 -70 -82 -90 -84 16 
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; PI = portfolio investment; OI = other investment.  
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Source: calculations using the Eurostat datasets “International investment position - quarterly and 
annual data (BPM6) - [bop_iip6_q]” and “GDP and main components - Current prices 
[namq_10_gdp]”. 
 
Divergence within a monetary union, such as divergence in current account balances, is not 
necessarily a detrimental development. Capital flows across regions and the ensuing current 
account deficits and surpluses may reflect the improved utilization of resources when capital 
moves to fast-growing regions to the benefit of the entire monetary union. However, the 
booms and busts in the Irish and Spanish housing sectors (see Ahearne, Delgado, and von 
Weizsäcker 2008) exemplify capital misallocation. Moreover, the accumulation of 
“excessive” regional debt is undesirable, and there are good reasons to conclude that the 
external debt of Greece, Portugal, and Spain became excessive (Darvas 2012d). 
2.2 Lack of a crisis-resolution mechanism for euro-area countries 
There was no crisis-resolution mechanism for euro-area countries when the crisis erupted. 
We note that the same is the case in stand-alone countries—for example, the US and 
Canada do not have a financial facility to bail out states and provinces in trouble. And when 
studying the conditions required for a fiscal union to function smoothly and successfully, 
Bordo, Markiewicz, and Jonung (2011) concluded that “the first and probably the most 
important condition is a credible commitment to a no-bailout rule.” 
Still, the fear of cross-country contagion and negative spillovers across the euro area led to 
the design of various euro-area financial assistance facilities to help member states in 
trouble. The first Greek financial assistance programme, which started in May 2010, was 
financed by bilateral loans from other euro-area member states (coordinated by the 
European Commission), while two financing mechanisms were created, the temporary 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)3 and the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism (EFSM),4 with a combined lending capacity of €500 billion. Later, the EFSF was 
replaced by a permanent institution, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).5  
2.3 Large financial support 
Exceptionally large loans were granted to governments (by the various EU funds and the 
IMF) and huge amount of liquidity was provided to banks (by the ECB). Figure 2 shows the 
committed financing of the assistance programmes to governments both in nominal terms 
and as a share of GDP, for the seven EU countries that received full assistance 
programmes. Ireland and Portugal were granted about 40 percent of their GDP (not counting 
Ireland’s own contribution to the total volume of financing); Cyprus was granted about 50 
percent of GDP, and the three Greek programmes (which have some overlaps) committed to 
more than 150 percent of Greek GDP. Concerning only the loans granted by the IMF, Figure 
7 of Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013) compares all IMF programmes in 1993–2012 and shows that 
loans to euro-area countries (as a share of the receiving country’s GDP) were larger than 
loans to emerging economies. And IMF loans comprise only a small share of total financing: 
                                                          
3 https://www.esm.europa.eu/efsf-overview  
4 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/efsm/index_en.htm  
5 https://www.esm.europa.eu/  
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as Figure 2 indicates, the share of IMF funding in total funding was about one-third in Ireland 
and Portugal and one-tenth in Greece and Cyprus.  
 
Figure 2: Size and composition of financial assistance programmes of European 
Union countries 
                  €billions                                    percent of previous year GDP 
 
EU = European Union, GDP = gross domestic product, IMF = International Monetary Fund. 
Note: Committed amounts, in billion euros (left panel) and as a percentage of previous year GDP 
(right panel). There is overlap between the first and second Greek programmes, since the first 
programme was terminated when the second programme was agreed and some of the unused funds 
of the first programme were reallocated to the second programme. The EU includes all kinds of 
European Union facilities (including bilateral loans). “Other external” includes the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Source: Euro values (left panel): Data collected from the European Commission’s website: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-
financial-assistance_en. For the right panel, these euro values were divided by gross domestic 
product at current market prices (source: European Commission’s AMECO dataset).  
 
Bank financing via ECB liquidity support was also huge. The ECB, or put it correctly, the 
Eurosystem (which consists of the ECB and the national central banks of those countries 
that have adopted the euro)6 provided massive amounts of liquidity to banks throughout the 
euro area during the crisis, but especially to those peripheral countries that suffered from the 
triple problem of weak banks, difficulties in financing public debt, and weak competitiveness.  
Figure 3 shows that financing via regular Eurosystem operations exceeded €100 billion in 
the cases of Irish and Greek banks and about €60 billon in Portugal. In Cyprus, the peak 
was at €8 billion, which is almost half the Cypriot GDP.  
                                                          
6 See more details at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/escb/html/index.en.html  
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Figure 3: Use of Eurosystem main and longer-term refinancing operations by banks, 
January 2003–January 2017 (€ billion) 
 
Source: Bruegel database of Eurosystem lending operations developed in Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 
(2012). 
 
However, regular Eurosystem operations can be accessed only against suitable collateral. 
Even though the ECB has relaxed its collateral standards several times (Darvas and Merler 
2013), a number of banks in hard-hit countries run out of enough (or sufficiently high quality) 
collateral to access normal Eurosystem operations. Under such cases, national central 
banks provided emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to banks that were considered solvent, 
but exceptionally and temporarily running out of eligible collateral. The ELA operations are 
under the sole risk of the national central bank concerned, yet the ECB’s Governing Council 
has to agree to it in advance, can set the limit for the total ELA funding, and can at any time 
order an ELA programme to be stopped. While the ELA statistics are opaque, certain items 
in central bank balance sheets likely indicate ELA.  
Figure 4 shows available data for Greece, Ireland, and Cyprus, but unfortunately we could 
not collect data for Portugal. In Greece, ELA exceeded €100 billion and fluctuated widely—it 
typically increased when standard Eurosystem refinancing fell (Figure 3), suggesting a 
persistently high funding gap of banks, which was filled be a combination of standard and 
emergency financing. In Cyprus, ELA increased to €11 billion, well over the volume of 
standard financing, and thereby total central bank liquidity assistance amounted to more 
than 100 percent of Cypriot GDP. 
 
Since the height of the crisis, both regular (Figure 3) and emergency (Figure 4) liquidity 
support has fallen in all four countries, suggesting that the trust in the banking systems of 
these countries is gradually returning, possibly because their soundness improved.  
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Figure 4: Use of emergency liquidity assistance by banks, January 2003–February 
2017 (€ billion) 
 
Note: Emergency liquidity assistance is provided by a national central bank after obtaining 
authorization from the European Central Bank Governing Council. Data for Portugal is not available. 
Source: National Central Banks.  
 
2.4 Low inflation contributed to the real exchange rate adjustment in the euro area 
Within the euro area, there is no possibility of currency devaluation to quickly regain 
competitiveness and there is no stand-alone central bank that could align monetary 
conditions to the special needs of the country. A key problem of euro-area periphery 
countries is that in the pre-crisis period wages and prices rose much faster than productivity, 
which led to an overvaluation of the real exchange rate. These developments also reflected 
in the huge widening of current account deficits and the consequent increase in external 
debt, as we discussed in the first point above. At the same time, wages in Germany and 
some other core euro-area countries rose at a smaller pace than productivity, improving 
wage competitiveness in these countries. The euro crisis made it clear that a large 
macroeconomic adjustment is needed: the misaligned real exchange rates of euro-periphery 
countries had to depreciate, while current account deficits needed to turn to surpluses. 
However, given euro-area membership, the role played by nominal depreciation of the 
exchange depreciation is limited, for two reasons.  
On the one hand, euro exchange rate changes depend on the developments in the euro 
area as a whole. Arguably, if euro periphery countries had their own currencies, depreciation 
of those currencies would have been much larger than the magnitude of actual depreciation 
of the euro was. Hungary and Romania adopted a floating exchange rate system and the 
depreciation of the Hungarian forint and the Romanian leu was much larger than the 
depreciation of the euro.  
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On the other hand, euro depreciation can address the real exchange rate relative to non-
euro countries. However, about half of foreign trade of most euro countries is with other 
euro-area countries, and as we argued above, the real exchange rate of euro periphery 
countries became overvalued relative to core euro-area countries. This necessitates an 
intra-euro real exchange rate adjustment. The adjustment of the real exchange rate between 
euro members is possible only through prices and wages, that is, prices and wages of 
periphery countries have to fall relative to prices and wages in core countries. The same 
applies to Latvia too, which maintained a fixed exchange rate against the euro until the 
country eventually joined the euro area on 1 January 2014. 
Figure 5 shows that considering the monthly consumer-price-based real effective exchange 
rate (REER) calculated relative to 138 trading partners, all financial assistance programme 
countries, but Latvia, experienced depreciation. Among the euro countries, only Ireland 
achieved a much larger real depreciation than Germany. The two floating exchange rate 
countries, Hungary and Romania, experienced a sudden depreciation in the aftermath of the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in late 2008, yet the overall depreciation in December 2007–
January 2017 was rather similar to that of Germany.  
 
Figure 5: Real effective exchange rates based on consumer prices, January 1995–
January 2017, (December 2007 = 100) 
 
Note: The monthly real effective exchange rate is calculated against 138 trading partners, using 
country-specific trade weights. 
Source: Updated data set of Darvas (2012a). http://bruegel.org/publications/datasets/real-effective-
exchange-rates-for-178-countries-a-new-database/  
 
Table 2 decomposes the change in the real effective exchange rate to nominal effective 
exchange rate changes and changes in relative prices. We use annual data between 2007 
and 2016 in order to focus on the broader trends and minimize the noise inherent in monthly 
data due to short-term volatility of nominal exchange rates.  
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Table 2: Change in the real effective exchange rate, 2007–2016 (percent)  
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Real effective exchange rate -8.1 -15.1 -5.4 -8.1 -9.0 -12.3 8.0 -14.8 
of which: 
             Nominal effective exchange rate 1.6 -3.2 0.2 3.2 -1.6 -19.7 12.3 -23.5 
     Relative prices -9.5 -12.3 -5.6 -10.9 -7.5 9.2 -3.8 11.3 
Note: The annual real effective exchange rate is calculated against 172 trading partners, using 
country-specific trade weights. 
Source: Updated data set of Darvas (2012a). http://bruegel.org/publications/datasets/real-effective-
exchange-rates-for-178-countries-a-new-database/  
 
The two floating exchange rate countries indicate a rather different pattern from euro-area 
countries and Latvia (which maintained a pegged rate and joined the euro in 2015): in 
Hungary and Romania, the nominal effective exchange rate fell by about 20 percent from 
2007 to 2016, while there was higher inflation in these countries than in their trading 
partners. 
In euro-area countries, prices fell relative to trading partners and nominal depreciation was 
much smaller, or there was even a nominal appreciation. The same applies to Latvia, a 
country that maintained a fixed exchange rate until it joined the euro in 2015. Therefore, the 
real exchange rate adjustment largely fell on relative price adjustment in euro-area countries, 
including in Germany, reflecting the generally low inflation in the euro area in recent years.  
On the contrary, floating exchange rate countries relied on nominal exchange rate 
adjustment, which is a faster way of adjustment, and also easier, since prices and wages 
tend to be sticky downward. However, when a country has large foreign debt and domestic 
credit creation predominantly relies on foreign currency lending (as in many central 
European countries), nominal depreciation can create balance sheet problems. 
Beyond these overall trends, there are some differences between the euro countries. Prices 
relative to trading partners fell in Germany by 7.5 percent, even more than in Portugal. The 
largest relative price fall was observed in Ireland (12.3 percent), suggesting that the Irish 
economy was more flexible than other euro-area countries. The overall nominal exchange 
rate change ranged between minus 3.2 percent in Ireland and plus 3.2 percent in Cyprus, 
reflecting the different composition of their foreign trade. One reason for the larger nominal 
depreciation of Ireland is the rather high share (19.5 percent) of the US in Ireland’s trade 
basket, while the share of the US in the trade basket of Greece, Cyprus, and Portugal is 
between 4.2 percent–6.6 percent, and 12.2 percent in Germany. Therefore, the depreciation 
of the euro against the US dollar had a much larger effect on the nominal effective exchange 
rate of Ireland than in other euro countries. In Latvia, there was a rather large (12.3 percent) 
nominal effective exchange rate appreciation, partly reflecting the larger share of the 
Russian Federation in Latvia’s foreign trade, since the Russian currency depreciated 
enormously in 2007–2016.  
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The overall real effective depreciation from 2007 to 2016 was the largest in Ireland (15.1 
percent), followed by Romania (14.8 percent) and Hungary (12.3 percent). Germany had a 
larger depreciation (9.0 percent) than Greece, Cyprus, and Portugal, which leads us to the 
next issue, the lack of a symmetric adjustment. 
2.5 Asymmetric intra-euro adjustment  
While in the pre-crisis period there was a symmetrical divergence in price/wage 
competitiveness among euro area deficit and surplus countries (i.e. wages and prices 
increased at a slow rate in Germany and Austria and at a fast rate in Spain and other 
periphery countries), intra-euro adjustment during the euro-crisis was largely asymmetric. 
Periphery wages started to adjust (wage decline or at least a stop in wage increase), but 
wage growth hardly accelerated in Germany and other euro-area surplus countries. This 
made the adjustment of periphery countries more difficult. A symmetric adjustment, whereby 
wage growth decelerates in periphery countries and accelerates in core countries, would 
facilitate the intra-euro adjustment.  
Furthermore, lack of sufficiently fast wage growth in core countries necessitates even larger 
wage and price falls in periphery countries, which make the sustainability of both public and 
private debts more difficult. In contrast to a stand-alone country, where low inflation is 
typically followed by reduced nominal interest rates, in a heterogeneous monetary union like 
the euro area, low inflation in a particular (periphery) country is unlikely to lead to lower 
interest rates there. Such divergence between inflation and interest rates was also observed 
in the pre-crisis period, when interest rates converged between euro-area countries, despite 
major differences in inflation rates. In more recent years, nominal interest rates of periphery 
countries were well above the interest rates observed in core euro-area countries despite 
lower inflation, due to increased risk of sovereign default in the periphery. Therefore, wage 
and price falls in the periphery may not be followed by reductions in the nominal interest 
rates, while lower prices increase debt/income ratios, challenging debt sustainability further. 
A more symmetric intra-euro adjustment would have helped to find a better balance between 
regaining price competitiveness and maintaining debt sustainability in the periphery (see a 
detailed discussion of this issue in Darvas 2013).  
Additionally, the overall macroeconomic situation in the euro area was generally weak, at 
least in 2010–2013, i.e., during the initial years of the euro-area financial assistance 
programmes. Weak external conditions made the adjustment of periphery countries even 
more difficult.  
2.6 Unique Troika formation 
Finally, the Troika arrangement was unprecedented, with three institutions operating under 
different rules and mandates.  
The IMF’s role was similar to all other IMF-supported programmes: its own staff assessed 
and negotiated programme modalities and the IMF Board made the final decisions. The key 
novelty for the IMF was to share programme discussions and financing with European 
partners and to coordinate the assessments and financing: programme financing had to be 
approved and actually disbursed by both the IMF and European facilities to have adequate 
funding. 
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The roles of the European Commission and the ECB were more unusual. As explained by 
Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013), the European Commission merely acted on behalf of the member 
states, rather than as an independent institution representing the general interest of the EU, 
which is its normal function. The European Commission’s role was complicated also 
because of its task of safeguarding the proper application of European treaties. For example, 
it should ensure that European fiscal rules enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact are 
followed by all member states, yet in the case of a country under financial assistance, 
considerations different from the Stability and Growth Pact rules could emerge. Another 
example is bank recapitalization from public funds, which was an element of all financial 
assistance programmes. Yet, the Commission has a clear mandate to avoid competitive 
distortions arising from state aid to financial institutions. 
The role of the ECB was also unusual. In a standard IMF programme, including the joint 
IMF–EU programmes for Hungary, Latvia, and Romania, the national central bank 
negotiates along with the receiving country’s government. Programme conditionality used to 
set measures to be adopted in connection with the national central bank. However, in the 
case of euro-area programmes the ECB negotiated in the team of the lenders, along with the 
IMF and the European Commission.  
The ECB’s participation in the design and monitoring of financial assistance programmes 
creates potential conflicts of interest with its other tasks, which may bias programme 
conditionality and expose the ECB to pressure from the other Troika institutions (Darvas and 
Merler 2013). 
 There is a potential conflict with the ECB’s price stability mandate. In the programme 
negotiations, the fear that fiscal unsustainability in a particular country might result in 
pressure on the central bank to soften its monetary stance might lead the ECB to 
overemphasize the need for fiscal consolidation. In the implementation phase of 
programmes, the ECB might be tempted to deviate from its price stability objective to 
help improve fiscal sustainability in a given programme country. The experience so 
far has demonstrated that the ECB had indeed argued for very ambitious fiscal 
adjustment strategies, yet there is no evidence at all for inflationary bias and in fact 
the major problem is that inflation undershoots the target. 
 There is a potential conflict of interest with the ECB’s function of lender of last resort 
to banks. Banks in programme countries are typically under high stress and need to 
rely heavily on ECB liquidity. In the programme negotiations, the ECB might seek to 
minimize liquidity operations that constitute a risk to its own balance sheet, and to 
label banking problems as solvency problems that would need to be addressed 
through state bailout or through bail-in of private shareholders and creditors. In the 
implementation phase of programmes, however, the ECB might actually be inclined 
to provide liquidity on soft terms, as would any central bank interested in the success 
of the programme. 
 There is a potential conflict of interest with the ECB’s bond-purchase programmes. 
By buying bonds of vulnerable countries, the ECB becomes formally a creditor of the 
governments receiving financial assistance, and this may influence its position in the 
negotiations. Fear of losses stemming from its bond holdings might lead the ECB to 
be especially tough on fiscal consolidation or especially timid on debt restructuring—
if the latter were needed—to reduce the likelihood of losses on its holdings. The 
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Greek case, in which the ECB loudly rejected debt restructuring even a few weeks 
before such a decision was made by euro-area heads of state, and then negotiated a 
special position so that ECB holdings of Greek government bonds were not 
restructured, clearly underlines this threat. 
 Furthermore, the 2012 announcement of the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) introduced a very unusual situation, which could be best described as 
“monetary policy with conditionality.” Undoubtedly, the OMT announcement in 2012 
was a major turning point of the euro-area crisis and was a wise decision by the ECB 
Governing Council (see Darvas 2012c). However, OMT is regarded as a monetary 
policy instrument, but it can be activated only if there is a European Stability 
Mechanism programme in place, which is implemented properly. Therefore, a 
monetary policy instrument is activated subject to considerations that would not 
strictly pertain to a central bank in the exercise of its monetary policy competencies. 
And the ECB explicitly commits to terminate the OMT not only—as would be 
logical—in case the latter is no longer warranted from a monetary policy perspective, 
but also in case the beneficiary country fails to comply with the required 
conditionality. 
 
3. Three different ways to assess programme success 
There are three ways to assess the success of financial assistance programmes (Pisani-
Ferry et al. 2013):  
 Success in creating conditions to regain market access; 
 Degree of compliance with loan conditionality; and 
 Actual economic performance no worse than planned. 
 
3.1 Criterion 1: Creating conditions to regain market access 
All countries but Greece were able to return to market borrowing. Since a major goal of any 
financial assistance programme is to help the country return to borrowing from the market on 
a sustainable basis, six of the seven EU financial assistance countries should be considered 
successful in this regard. 
However, two euro-area countries, Portugal and Cyprus, have to pay a relatively high spread 
to Germany, at about 300/350 basis points at 10-year maturity borrowing (Figure 6). Given 
the still high level of public debts of these countries as a share of GDP (131 percent in 
Portugal and 107 percent in Cyprus at the end of 2016),7 these countries may face market 
tensions once the ECB will stop quantitative easing and interest rates will rise, unless a very 
robust economic recovery starts and thereby spreads fall.  
The Irish return to market borrowing was so successful that its current 10-year government 
bond spread to Germany is only about 50–70 basis points. In fact, the cost of market 
borrowing was so much lower than the interest rates on IMF loans and, therefore, Ireland 
repaid the IMF early in 2014–2015, saving about €1.5 billion in interest.  
                                                          
7 Data source: February 2017 AMECO data set of the European Commission. 
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Latvia, a country that joined the euro area in 2014, also experienced a marked fall in its 
borrowing costs and, in fact, it can borrow at a lower rate than Ireland. In autumn of 2016, 
the spread over the German 10-year yield fell below 20 basis points and was still at a rather 
low level of 64 basis points in January 2017, following a general global increase in 
government bond yields after the November 2017 US presidential elections. Public debt is 
very low in Latvia at 39 percent of GDP (end-of-2016 data) and the Latvian government 
demonstrated its determination to keep the budget under control even in the midst of a 20 
percent GDP fall during the recent crisis, which likely explains the low borrowing cost. 
In the two floating exchange rate countries, Hungary and Romania, the 10-year spread to 
Germany is currently at about 300 basis points. While the spreads of these countries is 
similar to the spreads of Portugal and Cyprus, they should be assessed more favourably, for 
three reasons:  
 First, these countries could borrow at about the same spread to Germany in the pre-
crisis period when there were huge capital inflows into these countries (see Darvas 
and Szapáry 2010), while the spread of Cyprus and Portugal to Germany was almost 
zero in the pre-crisis period. Therefore, current spreads of Hungary and Romania 
have just returned to the favourable pre-crisis values, while in Portugal and Cyprus 
current rates are much higher.  
 Second, according to current forecasts, Hungary and Romania are expected to grow 
faster and thereby expected to have higher inflation than Cyprus and Portugal, 
implying that the real interest will be lower in Hungary and Romania than in Cyprus 
and Portugal.  
 Third, the level of public debt as a share of GDP is much lower in Hungary and 
Romania than in Cyprus and Portugal, which combined with the lower real interest 
rates, implies that the real resources needed to service public debt is much lower in 
these two central European countries than in Cyprus and Portugal. 
As regards Greece, we also note that the Greek government issued €4 billion of bonds in 
April 2014 at a rate of 4.95 percent at 5-year maturity, which was assessed favourably by the 
government and boosted plans of market return.8 However, the 4.95 percent rate was still 
very high (and the 10-year interest rate we considered so far was at 6.2 percent that time, an 
even higher rate) and, in our assessment, borrowing at such a rate would have led to an 
unsustainable debt trajectory. Also, the volume of this 2014 bond issuance was relatively low 
and the bond was issued under English law, which offered a relatively strong protection. 
Therefore, even if the second financial assistance programme would have been finalized 
smoothly and the stalemate between the new Greek government and official creditors in the 
first half of 2015 would have been avoided, Greece would not have been able to return to 
market borrowing in 2015 in our view. 
 
                                                          
8 See the Reuters report, “Greece returns to bond markets, says end of bailout nears” at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/greece-bonds-idUSL6N0N21X220140410  
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Figure 6: 10-year government bond yields, January 2006–February 2017 (percent) 
  
Note: For Cyprus, correct data for several months is not available. 
Source: European Central Bank.  
 
Finally, we note that in our assessment there is no prospect for Greece returning to market 
borrowing at the end of the current third financial assistance programme in 2018. Even if 
economic growth will accelerate in 2017–2018, as we expect, and thereby the public 
debt/GDP ratio will decline, it will be still very high, and more than 80 percent of it will be due 
to official creditors. Greek politics and economic development will continue to be 
characterized by major uncertainties. It is inconceivable to us that under such conditions 
Greece will be able to borrow at an affordable interest rate from the market. So either a big 
restructuring of official loans will be needed or a fourth financial assistance programme. The 
Eurogroup indicated already at the inception of the third financial assistance programme in 
summer of 2015 that some form of debt relief could be provided if Greece will meet loan 
conditions. There does not seem to be a political willingness to offer Greece a major haircut 
in debt, so the debt relief will likely take the form of even longer maturities for loans, longer 
grace periods, slightly lower interest rates, and interest rate deferral or even holiday. Such 
measures would be helpful in reducing the cost of annual debt service and repayment, but in 
our view they will not be sufficient to avert a fourth financial assistance programme. 
 
3.2 Criterion 2: Compliance with conditionality under various headings 
Programme conditionality typically involves measures to improve fiscal sustainability, finance 
sector stability, and better functioning of various institutions and markets in order to foster 
competitiveness, productivity growth and employment. 
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Table 3 indicates a large variation both in the number of conditions as well as their 
composition across the key headings.9 The number of conditions ranges from 21 in Hungary 
to 108 in the second Greek programme.  
Certainly, not all conditions are similarly difficult within and across countries, yet the number 
of conditions and its distribution across the various headings can indicate the intrusiveness 
and the key emphases of the programmes10. 
Key headings are related to the general government with 21 conditions on average (ranging 
between 1 in Hungary and 52 in the second Greek programme), and the finance sector 
reform with 19 conditions on average (ranging between 7 in the first Greek programme and 
29 in Ireland).  
The Hungarian programme concentrated heavily on the finance sector, with only three 
conditions in other areas. The Irish programme included only general government and 
finance sector measures. The programmes for Latvia, Romania, and Cyprus included 
conditions in a few other areas too, while the two Greek programmes and the Portuguese 
programme were rather comprehensive in the sense of having several conditions in various 
other areas too.  
Conditions related to exchange systems and restrictions were added only for Cyprus in 
relation to the capital controls that were introduced.  
Labour market reforms included the following measures: 
 Greece: removing restrictions to competition in regulated professions including 
lawyers, notaries, engineers, architects, and auditors11; reform of collective 
bargaining systems; minimum wage cut; reducing labour market exit costs and non-
wage costs, reform of severance payments. 
 Portugal: reform of severance payments; deficit-neutral reduction in labour taxes; 
reform of collective agreements. 
 Latvia: establishment of a committee to promote wage restraint; preparation of new 
active labour market policy measures. 
Other structural measures include various reforms related to prompting better regulation 
affecting businesses, but also include some labour market measures (even though there is a 
separate ‘Labour market’ heading) and financial stability measures (even though there is a 
separate ‘Financial sector’ heading). The key areas of these other reforms were: 
                                                          
9 The third Greek program is not included, because the IMF has not yet decided to participate in this program and 
therefore it is not included in the IMF’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) database. The second and 
third programs for Romania are not included either, because Romania considered those programs as 
precautionary and no money was disbursed from these programs.  
10 None of the seven countries received conditions related to “international trade policy, excluding customs 
reforms” and “economic statistics excluding fiscal and central bank transparency and similar measures,’ two 
headings which were included in many other IMF programmes. Therefore, we do not list these headings in Table 
3. Trade policy is an EU-level competency. Statistical methodologies are harmonized in the EU and the 
production of statistics is supervised by Eurostat, the EU’s statistical office, and specific conditions for fiscal 
statistics were added in some cases: Greece was asked to revise the methodology of government finance 
statistics, while Ireland, Hungary, and Portugal received some related recommendations, like passing a budget 
responsibility law. 
11 This condition was listed under the “Labour market” heading in the first Greek programme, while a very similar 
condition was listed under “Other structural measures” in the second Greek programme. 
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 Greece: deregulation and liberalisation of various sectors and professions; removal 
of barriers to competition; reduction of administrative burdens; investment licensing 
law; reduction of the employers' share of social security contributions; improving 
social security contribution collection; judicial reform; align frameworks on collective 
dismissals and industrial actions with EU best practices. 
 Portugal: judicial reform (court structure and procedure); publicly quoted companies; 
competition law; insolvency law; elimination of the power guarantee investment 
incentive for power plants. 
 Cyprus: foreclosure law; insolvency law; property law; wage setting framework. 
 Latvia: insolvency law. 
 
Table 3: Total number of conditions by reform headings  
 
Greece 
1 
Greece 
2 
Portugal Ireland Cyprus Hungary Latvia Romania 
Total 45 95 55 36 50 19 48 24 
General government 23 45 20 9 11 1 15 12 
Central Bank 1 1   5    
Civil service and 
public employment 
reforms, and wages 
2 4 4    2 2 
Pension and other 
social sector 
reforms 
3 4 2  2 1 3 2 
Public enterprise 
reform and pricing 
(nonfinance sector) 
4 3 8  1 1 3  
Finance sector 7 22 10 27 20 16 21 8 
Exchange systems 
and restrictions 
(current and capital) 
    4    
Labour markets, 
excluding public 
sector employment 
3 6 4    3  
Other structural 
measures 
2 10 7  7  1  
Note: empty cells indicate no condition under a particular heading. 
Source: International Monetary Fund’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements database, considering the 
final (or last completed) programme reviews. 
 
Building on but modifying the methodology of Terzi (2015), the dynamics of reform efforts 
measured by the number of conditions met by each review is displayed on Figure 7. It is 
difficult to observe a general pattern, though in Ireland, Cyprus, and Portugal there seem to 
be some decline toward the end of the programme. The largest number of reforms was 
implemented by Greece, which is not surprising, given that Greece received the largest 
number of conditions (Table 3). 
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Figure 7: Number of reforms implemented 
(A) By each review  
  
(B) Cumulatively 
  
Note: The numbers on the horizontal axis indicate the number of the programme review. The time 
between subsequent reviews was not always the same, see Figure 8. 
Source: Calculations based on the International Monetary Fund’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements 
database.  
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Figure 8: Timeline of the reviews 
 
Source: Figure 5 of Terzi (2015) updated with the International Monetary Fund’s Monitoring of Fund 
Arrangements database.  
 
However, not all conditions were met. Figure 9 shows that on average only about 70 percent 
of the conditions were met on time, another 11 percent with a delay, and another 4 percent 
were implemented partially, leaving, on average, 15 percent of the number of conditionally 
unmet and 1 percent waived.  
The best performers in terms of on-time implementation are Ireland, Romania, Portugal, and 
Hungary, while in terms of any kind of implementation (on-time, delayed, and partial) 
Portugal is followed by Ireland, Romania, and Latvia. The second Greek programme had the 
weakest implementation record, which is not surprising given the widely reported tensions 
between the Greek government and official creditors in the second half of 2015 and the 
reluctance of the new Greek government that was elected in January 2016 to complete the 
second programme. The implementation record was not great in Cyprus either. 
 
R0 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
R0 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
R0 R1 R2R3 R4R5 R6R7
R0 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R0 R1R2 R3R4 R5
R0 R1R2 R3 R4R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10R11R12
R0 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8R9 R10 R11
R0 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5R6R7 R8 R9
Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Hungary Latvia Romania Greece 1 Greece 2 Ireland Portugal Cyprus
 19 
Figure 9: All conditions – implementation record (share of the total number of conditions)  
 
Note: For each case, we considered the final (or last) review included in the Monitoring of Fund 
Arrangements (MONA) database, which classifies implementation status as five categories reported 
in the figure plus conditions which were still outstanding. Given that we considered the last review for 
each programme, we considered outstanding conditions as not being met. In the case of Greece, 
some of the outstanding conditions were incorporated in the next assistance programme. The 
numerical values on each portion of the bar indicate the number of conditions.  
Source: International Monetary Fund’s MONA database.  
 
The rate of compliance with loan conditionality was not a good predictor of programme 
success (Figure 10).  
 While there are different ways to assess programme success, a clear indicator is the 
success in returning to market borrowing, which can be assessed by long-term 
government bond yields, as we discussed in Section 3.1. Since there was a global 
decline in both nominal and real interest rates of highly rated advanced countries in 
the past decades, a useful indicator is the change in the spread to Germany from the 
pre-crisis period to more recent years. Germany is the largest EU country and it 
maintained its AAA credit rating. While the change in spread to Germany is an 
imperfect indicator given that there is a wide-spread recognition that risk pricing 
before the global crisis pre-crisis may have not been correct for both euro-area and 
central and eastern European countries, in our view it can still capture well the 
success in regaining market access. 
 Compliance with loan conditionality can be measured in different ways: whether we 
consider the share of only on-time implemented reforms, or additionally reforms 
implemented with a delay, or additionally partially implemented reforms. Also, 
arguably, some reforms are presumably more important from a particular perspective 
than others that we do not aim to assess. However, if we presume that only 
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‘important’ reforms were included in loan conditionality, the share of implemented 
reforms is a useful indicator for the compliance with loan conditionality.  
Figure 10 shows that there is no clear correlation between the implementation rate 
(measured in three alternative ways) and the change in government bond spread relative to 
Germany from the pre-crisis period (for which we consider 2002-06) to more recent years 
(the average of 2015-16), suggesting that the rate of compliance with loan conditionality was 
not a good predictor of programme success. 
Figure 10: Implementation record vs change in the government bond yield spread to 
Germany  
A) Only on-time implemented B) On-time and delayed 
implemented 
C) On-time, delayed and 
partially implemented 
 
Note: the spread change shows the change in the 10-year government bond spread to Germany from 
the average of 200-06 to 2015-16. Source: Bruegel calculation using data from the European Central 
Bank (interest rate) and IMF Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) database (implementation 
rate). 
 
We also focus on the two key aspects of the conditions, general government and finance 
sector reform. Hungary shows a 100 percent score for implemented general government 
reform, given that its single condition, the passage of draft fiscal responsibility law, was 
done. Excluding Hungary, the average on-time implementation rate was 71 percent (Figure 
11), slightly above the overall implementation rate. Portugal, Ireland, and Romania had the 
best record in this regard and the second Greek programme the worst. 
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Figure 11: General government conditions – implementation record (share of the 
number of conditions)  
 
Note: For each case, we considered the final (or last) review included in the Monitoring of Fund 
Arrangements (MONA) database, which classifies implementation status as five categories reported 
in the figure plus conditions which were still outstanding. Given that we considered the last review for 
each programme, we considered outstanding conditions as not being met. In the case of Greece, 
some of the outstanding conditions were incorporated in the next assistance programme. The 
numerical values on each portion of the bar indicate the number of conditions. 
Source: International Monetary Fund’s MONA database.  
A key aspect of general government conditions was fiscal consolidation, since budget 
deficits increased to high levels by the inception of financial assistance programme (Figure 
12). The only exception was Hungary, where large budget deficits were recorded in the mid-
2000s and by 2008 the budget balance already improved due to a major fiscal adjustment. 
Unfortunately, there is no good up-to-date measure of fiscal adjustment. The most widely 
used indicator, the so-called structural budget balance, suffers from a number of conceptual 
weaknesses and is subject to large revisions, as demonstrated by Claeys, Darvas, and 
Leandro (2016). Still, lacking a better measure, Figure 13 indicates the dynamics of the 
primary structural balance of the general government, which can be illustrative of the fiscal 
efforts made by the governments. 
The largest structural primary deficit, 10 percent of GDP, was attained in Greece in 2009 and 
the largest fiscal adjustment was also made by the subsequent Greek governments 
amounting to about 16 percent of GDP. The change in the structural primary balance as a 
share of GDP was about 8 percent–9 percent in Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, and Romania and 
6 percent in Latvia. Hungary started its fiscal adjustment in 2006 and, by 2008, the structural 
primary budget almost reached a balanced position. That is, by the time the country was 
forced to ask for financial assistance, it had a rather favourable fiscal situation, which likely 
explains why there was no condition on fiscal adjustment and the sole general government 
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condition required to pass the draft budget responsibility law. Still, after the structural primary 
surplus fell from 1 percent of GDP to zero, the Hungarian government also implemented a 
fiscal adjustment of about 3 percent of GDP.  
On the other hand, Germany implemented a rather modest fiscal adjustment by changing its 
structural primary balance from a surplus of about 1 percent of GDP to a surplus slightly 
below 3 percent.  
 
Figure 12: Overall budget balance of the general government (percent of GDP) 
  
Source: European Commission’s February 2017 AMECO database. 
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Figure 13: Primary structural budget balance of general government (percent of GDP) 
   
Note: The structural balance is an estimate of the “underlying” budget balance, by excluding the 
estimated impacts of the economic cycle and one-time items from the budget balance. The primary 
balance is the overall balance excluding interest. The November 2016 database includes data starting 
from 2010. For earlier years, we use the May 2014 estimates adjusted by the difference between the 
November 2016 and May 2014 estimates for 2010. 
Source: European Commission’s May 2014 and February 2017 AMECO databases.  
 
The second key aspect of financial assistance programmes was finance sector reforms. The 
on-time implementation record was slightly better (at 70 percent) than the overall 
implementation rate, with Ireland and Portugal having the best scores. Latvia implemented 
most of the conditions if we also consider delayed implementation.  
On average, one-quarter of the finance sector reforms were not implemented and, in some 
cases, there were problems with quality of implementation, as for example highlighted by 
Véron (2016) by analysing the Portuguese programme.  
Furthermore, the high share of nonperforming loans, especially in Greece and Cyprus, 
signals persistent problems (Figure 15).  
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Figure 14: Finance sector conditions – implementation record (share of the number of 
conditions)  
 
Note: For each case, we considered the final (or last) review included in the Monitoring of Fund 
Arrangements (MONA) database, which classifies implementation status as five categories reported 
in the figure plus conditions which were still outstanding. Given that we considered the last review for 
each programme, we considered outstanding conditions as not being met. In the case of Greece, 
some of the outstanding conditions were incorporated in the next assistance programme. The 
numerical values on each portion of the bar indicate the number of conditions. 
Source: International Monetary Fund’s MONA database. 
Figure 15: Share of non-performing loans, Q1 2008–Q2 2016 (percent) 
 
Note: Quarterly data are not available for Ireland, Portugal, and Romania in 2008 and 2009; for Latvia 
in 2008, 2009, and 2010; for Hungary in 2008; and for Germany in all years; for these years, the 
corresponding annual data is indicated in each quarter. 
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Source: International Monetary Fund Financial Soundness Indicators database.  
 
3.3 Criterion 3: Expectations versus outcomes 
A key aspect of the design of financial assistance programmes is a medium-term 
macroeconomic projection. The projection determines (among others) the amount of tax 
revenues to be collected and the amount of economic-cycle-dependent spending such as 
unemployment benefits. Thereby, the macroeconomic projection determines the volume of 
loans to be provided by the financial assistance programme, which is then fixed (in nominal 
terms) at the beginning of the programme.  
A funding gap of the government emerges if economic outcomes turn to be worse than 
planned in the programme. Since a country under financial assistance typically cannot 
borrow from the market, such a funding gap can be closed by additional fiscal consolidation 
or privatization, which in turn will likely have an effect on economic developments. Therefore, 
the macroeconomic projection has a crucial role in financial assistance programmes, since 
macroeconomic underperformance relative to the projection has serious consequences. 
Table 4 below summarizes key macroeconomic projections made at the inception of the 
assistance programmes and actual outcomes up to the date when projections were made 
public. For comparison, the table also includes Germany, by comparing the October 2010 
IMF World Economic Outlook projections with the most recent data. We chose the October 
2010 projection because that was made around the time when the first three euro-area 
financial assistance programmes were designed. The figures in the Annex report the annual 
development of GDP and unemployment rate relative to projections.  
Before assessing the key findings based on this table and the Annex charts, we would like to 
highlight that it is not possible to assess whether projections were “unbiased” or “optimistic” 
or “pessimistic.” Such an assessment would require a detailed analysis of the various 
assumptions behind the projections, along with an assessment of the models used. This task 
cannot be performed by relying on publicly available information.12 We can only compare 
whether actual outcomes became better or worse than the projections, but cannot assess 
whether any deviation was due to bad programme design or unexpected factors. 
The key observations from Table 4 and the annex charts are the following: 
 GDP:  
o In Germany, actual growth was practically the same as the October 2010 
projection, suggesting that it was possible to make an accurate GDP 
projection in 2010 for a relatively stable country. 
o In five countries (Greece, Portugal, Hungary, Latvia, and Romania), growth 
was significantly worse than planned, and especially in Greece. The reason 
behind this underperformance is not known: possible explanations include 
overly optimistic programme design, unexpected negative shocks, or perhaps 
the difficulties in making projections for vulnerable countries in the midst of 
the worst economic and financial crisis since the Second World War. 
                                                          
12 The evaluation report of the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF (2016) concluded that Greek and 
Portuguese programs incorporated “overly optimistic growth projections,” while the Irish program did not. 
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o Ireland grew more or less in line with projections up to 2014, while for 2015 
statistics show an incredible 26 percent GDP growth, which was clearly 
unexpected.13 
o Cyprus had better growth than planned. Since the Cypriot financial 
programme is the most recent among the financial assistance programmes 
we consider and for most other programmes outcomes became worse than 
planned, the design of the Cypriot programme may have been prepared on a 
cautious basis.14  
 Unemployment: Deviation of actual unemployment from programme assumption very 
much mirrors GDP developments. That is, in most countries actual unemployment 
became higher than planned when GDP growth was lower than planned. The two 
exceptions are Romania, where unemployment became slightly lower than planned 
despite much worse growth, and Germany, where unemployment became 
significantly lower than planned despite no significant deviation of GDP from the 
projection. 
 Public finances: Deviations of general government balance and debt from 
programme assumption also mirror GDP developments. In the five countries with 
worse than planned GDP growth, the budget deficit became slightly larger, and public 
debt became much larger than planned, while in Ireland and Cyprus both deficit and 
debt became lower. Public finances also became more favourable in Germany. 
 Current account: There is uniform pattern for seven of the eight countries irrespective 
of the deviation of actual GDP from its projection: the current account improved more 
than planned, including in Germany. This development suggests that there were 
common driving forces for higher surpluses in the whole EU. The exception is 
Cyprus, where the actual current account balance practically equals the planned 
balance. This could be explained again by the timing of the Cypriot programme: this 
was the most recent programme agreed in 2013, when current accounts of other EU 
countries already outperformed earlier expectations.  
 Inflation: There is no uniform pattern for inflation. Actual inflation turned to be rather 
similar to projections in Greece, Ireland, and Hungary, while inflation became 
significantly lower in Portugal, Cyprus, and Latvia. In Romania, inflation became 
higher than planned. 
To sum up, deviation of GDP developments from programme assumptions had a decisive 
role in deviations of public finances and unemployment from programme assumptions. There 
was practically no deviation of GDP from plan for Germany, but for five of the seven 
programme countries (both inside and outside the euro area) actual outcomes became much 
worse than planned. Overly optimistic programme design, unexpected negative shocks, or 
perhaps the difficulties in making projections for vulnerable countries in a deep crisis may 
explain this underperformance. Ireland developed along the projections up to 2014, while 
growth became better in Cyprus, probably because of the timing of its programme. The 
current account balance increased relative to projection in all countries including in 
Germany, while there is no uniform development in inflation. 
                                                          
13 We note that a number of commentators question the reliability of the 26 percent GDP growth number for 
2015, see for example Coffey (2016) and Regan (2016). 
14 We do not include the third financial assistance program for Greece in our study, since it is a very recent 
program, yet we note that outcomes so far also became much better than planned both for GDP (see Annex 
Figure 16) and public finances.  
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Table 4: Macroeconomic assumptions and outcomes: the seven European Union financial assistance countries and Germany 
 
Greece Ireland Portugal Cyprus 
Source Programme Actual Programme Actual Programme Actual Programme Actual 
Source Date May 2010 Oct 2016 Nov 2010 Oct 2016 May 2011 Oct 2016 Apr 2013 Oct 2016 
Period 2009–2015 cumulated 2009–2015 cumulated 2010–2016 cumulated 2012–2016 cumulated 
Real GDP (percent change) 1.2 -22.6 11.9 39.7 3.8 -3.7 -9.6 -4.4 
Inflation (percent change) 5.4 5.5 2.4 2.3 12.2 8.1 5.6 -2.4 
Period 2015 2015 2016 2016 
Unemployment (percent) 13.4 25.0 10.7 9.5 9.8 11.2 17.5 13.0 
Current account balance (percent of GDP) -1.9 0.0 -0.5 10.2 -2.2 0.0 -1.0 -0.9 
General government balance (percent of 
GDP) 
-2.0 -3.1 -4.8 -1.9 -1.8 -3.0 -2.3 -0.5 
General government debt (percent of GDP) 140.0 176.9 123.0 78.7 111.0 128.4 121.7 106.7 
 
 
Hungary Latvia Romania Germany 
Source Programme Actual Programme Actual Programme Actual IMF WEO Actual 
Source Date Oct 2008 Oct 2016 Dec 2008 Oct 2016 Apr 2009 Oct 2016 Oct 2010 Oct 2016 
Period 2007–2011 cumulated 2007–2013 cumulated 2008–2011 cumulated 2009–2015 cumulated 
Real GDP (percent change) 3.3 -3.4 -4.2 -9.7 0.7 -6.8 12.8 12.6 
Inflation (percent change) 19.3 20.4 29.2 25.3 13.9 18.5 9.6 8.5 
Period 2011* 2013 2011 2015 
Unemployment (percent) 8.5 10.1 9.5 11.9 7.7 7.2 6.7 4.6 
Current account balance (percent of GDP) -1.0 0.8 -5.5 -2.4 -6.2 -4.9 3.9 8.4 
General government balance (percent of 
GDP) 
-1.5 -5.5 1.1 -0.6 -2.7 -4.2 -1.4 0.7 
General government debt (percent of GDP) 66.2 80.8 33.5 35.9 25.7 33.9 75.6 71.0 
GDP = gross domestic product, IMF = International Monetary Fund, WEO = World Economic Outlook. 
* For Hungary, unemployment rate projections were published only up to 2009 and therefore we report the 2009 values for unemployment and 2011 values of 
all other indicators.  
Notes: The reference period is determined by the year before the programme started and the latest year for which the programme documents reported 
detailed projections. For Germany, we report the October 2010 IMF WEO projections, which were made at a time around the negotiations for the Irish 
programme.  
Sources: IMF country reports at the inception of the programme and the October 2010 and the October 2016 WEO databases. 
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3.4 Why has Greece suffered so much?  
While we argued earlier that it is difficult to identify the reasons for a discrepancy between 
actual and projected macroeconomic developments, Greece has suffered so much from a 25 
percent GDP depression, necessitating reasoning. 
Clearly, the pre-crisis growth model of Greece was unsustainable (see e.g., Darvas 2015), 
which made some GDP contraction inevitable. The Greek economy was characterized by 
widespread state control, inefficient public administration, corruption, excessive increases in 
public sector employment and wages, large increases in private sector wages well over 
productivity growth, and insufficient structural reforms.  
This model led to very unfavourable business conditions, which was reflected in Greece 
being ranked 108th out of 181 countries in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
indicator in 2008. Major vulnerabilities emerged, such as the –16 percent GDP current 
account balance in 2008, large foreign debt, and the huge budget deficit and public debt. 
Public debt increased to 127 percent of GDP in 2009 and was on an exploding path.  
Clearly, the Greek crisis that erupted from late 2009 onward was self-inflicted and certain 
GDP contraction was inevitable. However, the key question is whether the first Troika 
programme exacerbated the output fall. Hard evidence cannot be provided to answer this 
question and different people have different opinions. In my view, the answer is yes, for the 
following reasons.  
The European Commission and the ECB vehemently opposed public debt restructuring in 
2010 and early 2011. While the IMF staff had concerns about the sustainability of Greek 
public debt, the IMF agreed to join the programme without debt restructuring.  
In the absence of debt restructuring, the large 2009 budget deficit and the large and 
exploding public debt painted a very dark picture about the future trajectory of public debt. 
To compensate for that, some key assumptions of the financial assistance programme were 
designed in a way that seemed overly optimistic even back in 2010–2011 (see Darvas, 
Pisani-Ferry, and Sapir 2011): 
 Macroeconomic projections foresaw a short-lived and modest economic contraction: 
a 4.0 percent GDP decline in 2010, a 2.6 percent decline in 2011, and accelerating 
economic growth starting already in 2012.15 
 Primary budget balance target required an extremely ambitious adjustment: change 
from –8.6 percent of GDP in 2009 to 5.9 percent by 2014 and 6 percent in each year 
between 2015 and 2020.16 
 Extremely ambitious privatization receipts were planned: €5 billion by the end of 
2011, €15 billion by the end of 2012, and €50 billion by the end of 2015, which totals 
20 percent of GDP in 5 years.17 
                                                          
15 See Table 1 on page 26 of http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10110.pdf  
16 See Table A.1 on page 38 of http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10110.pdf  
17 The initial May 2010 program included a much more modest target: €5 billion in total by the end of 2015. The 
second review by the IMF published in December 2010 noted that “the authorities are preparing a more 
ambitious three year privatization strategy than originally foreseen in the program.” In early 2011, the target was 
increased to €50 billion; see the third program review by the IMF published in March 2011 ( 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1168.pdf ), which puts this plan into the perspective of earlier 
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From late 2010, markets started to worry about the sustainability of Greek public debt as it 
became clearer that the above three main programme assumptions will not be met. But all 
three Troika members, including the IMF, continued to oppose vehemently public debt 
restructuring in 2010 and in most of 2011, while the initial proposals for debt restructuring in 
the second half of 2011 were very timid. Therefore, a major uncertainty arose about the 
sustainability of Greek public debt, which led to uncertainty about Greek euro membership. 
The uncertainty receded only sometime in 2012, after the large public debt restructuring. 
However, the persistent uncertainty about the sustainability of Greek public debt and the 
euro-area membership of the country in 2010–2012 reduced investments in Greece and led 
to capital flight from the country, which weakened the economy further. GDP also became 
weaker due to negative confidence effects, a large fiscal multiplier, financial fragmentation in 
the euro area, and weak overall euro-area economic developments. Weak Greek GDP 
developments increased the budget deficit above the programme assumption, which 
necessitated further fiscal adjustment. This is turn led to an even weaker economy and an 
unfortunate vicious circle of fiscal adjustment and weaker output.  
Therefore, in my assessment the uncertainty related to the sustainability of Greek public 
debt and the consequent uncertainty in Greece’s euro-area membership in 2010–2012 were 
major negative factors behind the collapse of Greek GDP. These uncertainties relate to 
programme design by the Troika and were approved by euro-area member states and the 
IMF Board, so the lenders also have a responsibility for programme failure.  
Greece did not meet all programme conditions, but in my view this did not play a major role 
in the huge output collapse. As Figure 9 shows, the implementation record of the first Greek 
programme, measured as the percentage of conditions that were implemented, was not so 
weak and quite similar to the implementation record of Cyprus. The economic performance 
of Cyprus was much better than foreseen in its programme. While many factors may have 
influenced Cypriot developments and beyond the implementation record the types of non-
implemented measures and the quality of implemented measures matter too, the Cypriot 
example suggests that less-than-perfect implementation of programme conditionality should 
not necessarily imply weak economic development. 
 
4. Disagreements within the Troika 
Some studies assessed the cooperation within the Troika. For example, Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, 
and Wolff (2013) concluded that: 
“despite a number of tensions stemming from their different remits and 
rules, the EU and the IMF have succeeded in cooperating in Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal.” 
In a recent study, the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF (2016) concluded that: 
“the troika arrangement … proved to be an efficient mechanism in most 
instances for conducting program discussions with national authorities, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
privatization programs of other countries, and pages 13–16 and page 82 of the updated Memorandum of 
Understanding: https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2011/grc/070411.pdf 
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the IMF lost its characteristic agility as a crisis manager. And because the 
European Commission negotiated on behalf of the Eurogroup, the troika 
arrangement potentially subjected IMF staff’s technical judgments to 
political pressure from an early stage.” 
 
In this section, we do not contemplate a similarly comprehensive assessment of the 
cooperation within the Troika institutions. Instead, our goal is to highlight four specific 
episodes when there was a major disagreement between the Troika members, which could 
allow drawing lessons from these experiences for the cooperation between the IMF and 
regional safety nets in Asia.  
 
4.1 Disagreement between the International Monetary Fund and the European 
Commission: the 2008 Latvia example 
The Latvian programme was designed by the “duo” of the European Commission and the 
IMF. Latvia was not a member of the euro area in 2008 and therefore the ECB did not 
participate formally in the programme. 
Latvia has maintained a fixed exchange rate ever since the country became independent 
from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. After entering the EU in 2004, the Latvian lats 
joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) on 2 May 2005, which fixed the 
value of the lats to the euro with standard fluctuation margins of ±15 percent. However, 
Latvia unilaterally maintained a ±1 percent fluctuation band around the central rate.18 
Latvia asked for financial assistance in 2008. A major disagreement developed about the 
Latvian lats exchange rate between the IMF and the European Commission.  
The IMF and the European Commission institutions had diverging priorities: 
 The IMF’s priority: restore stability and promote growth in Latvia. 
 The European Commission’s priority: help the country in a way that sets good 
precedent for others and helps the stability of neighbours. 
The IMF and the European Commission had different assessments and proposals: 
 The IMF concentrated its attention on the Latvian exchange rate, which was 
“fundamentally misaligned” according to IMF staff assessment. Therefore, the IMF 
proposed currency devaluation, or at least allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate in 
the full ±15 percent wide band. The IMF also had concerns about the feasibility of the 
fiscal adjustment.  
 The European Commission insisted that the narrow exchange rate band should be 
preserved, which was in line with the priority of the Latvian government and central 
bank. 
Resolution of the dispute: 
                                                          
18 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/latvia-and-euro_en  
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 The IMF conceded; the narrow ±1 percent fluctuation band was not widened. 
 Very large fiscal adjustment was implemented (see Figure 13). 
 GDP contracted by 20 percent and unemployment skyrocketed (see Figure 21 in the 
Annex); 9 percent of the population (including about 20 percent of young cohorts) 
emigrated from Latvia in 2008–2011 (see Darvas 2013a). 
 Latvia adopted the euro in 2014. 
It is difficult to assess which institution was right. Latvian authorities, along with the 
European Commission, regard the programme successful, for three main reasons: (a) the 
exchange rate peg was maintained, (b) there was fast economic growth after the 20 percent 
GDP collapse (see Figure 21 in the Annex) and (c) Latvia could join the euro area in 2014.  
It is not possible to set a counterfactual scenario on what would have happened with 
devaluation. Most likely, GDP contraction in 2008–2010 would have been smaller, fiscal 
adjustment could have been smaller, fewer people would have emigrated from Latvia, and 
Latvia could have still joined the euro area in 2014.19 Therefore, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that Latvia would have suffered much smaller economic and social pain with 
devaluation (or at least the full use of the ±15 percent wide exchange rate fluctuation band) 
than its actual hardship was.  
A further key question is whether devaluation (or at least the full use of the ±15 percent wide 
exchange rate fluctuation band) in Latvia would have necessitated a similar change in 
neighbouring Estonia and Lithuania, and whether that would have had benign or adverse 
economic, financial, and social consequences in these two countries.  
 
4.2 Disagreement within the Troika: the 2010/2011 Greek example 
The Greek situation in 2010 was exceptional because of the large public sector and external 
imbalances and because of Greek membership in the euro area. It came as a surprise to 
European institutions that a euro-area member requires financial assistance, as we 
discussed in Section 2. One of the central issues in the 2010 negotiations was the 
sustainability of Greek public debt and whether debt restructuring was necessary.  
The three institutions had diverging priorities: 
 The IMF: restore stability and promote growth in Greece. 
 Europeans: ensure stability of the euro area (fear from contagion) and address Greek 
debt problem later, if needed. 
The three institutions had diverging assessments and objectives: 
 Up until early 2010, for exceptionally large lending, IMF articles required that “a 
rigorous and systematic analysis indicates that there is a high probability that the 
member’s public debt is sustainable in the medium term.” As Schadler (2016) notes, 
the consensus report submitted by IMF staff to the IMF Board stated that “on 
                                                          
19 The exchange rate criterion for joining the euro area requires a country to keep its exchange rate in a +/-15 
percent wide exchange rate band 2 years prior to entering the euro area and therefore devaluation in 2009 would 
have not excluded euro entry in 2014. 
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balance, staff considers debt to be sustainable over the medium term, but the 
significant uncertainties around this make it difficult to state categorically that this is 
the case with a high probability.” Therefore, IMF staff had doubts about Greek public 
debt sustainability.  
 Major European creditor countries did not have consensus about how to help 
Greece. A large share of Greece’s debt was owed to banks of other EU countries 
that had weak balance sheet that time. 
Resolution of the dispute: 
 Greek public debt was not restructured in 2010 as part of the financial assistance 
programme. Instead, extremely ambitious assumptions were made, as we discussed 
in Section 3.4.  
 Before granting a loan to Greece in 2010, the IMF Executive Board approved a major 
revision to the exceptional access criteria: “However, in cases where there are 
significant uncertainties that make it difficult to state categorically that there is a high 
probability that the debt is sustainable over this period, exceptional access would be 
justified if there is a high risk of international systemic spillovers.”  
 There were huge economic and social costs in Greece. 
 Debt was eventually restructured in March/April 2012, after the negative downward 
spiral of the economy intensified, as we argued in Section 3.4. 
There was dramatic economic and social hardship in Greece after the first financial 
assistance programme. It is again difficult to assess a counterfactual scenario under which 
debt was restructured in 2010 and thereby the financial assistance programme was based 
on more reasonable assumptions. However, there was practically no contagion to other 
weaker euro-area countries when debt restructuring was agreed in late 2011 and 
implemented in March/April 2012, which suggests that an earlier debt restructuring would 
have not caused major negative spillovers.  
It is sometimes argued that by the 2012 date of the Greek debt restructuring, the euro area 
had a stronger institutional framework to tackle spillovers. However, we find this argument 
weak. Arguably, the two most important measures that helped to contain the euro crisis were 
the decision on the establishment of the European banking union and the announcement of 
the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) instrument.20 Both of these announcements 
were made in summer of 2012, well after the decision on Greek debt restructuring. 
 
4.3 Disagreement within the Troika: The 2010/2011 Irish example 
Ireland was the fifth EU and the second euro-area country that asked for financial assistance 
in the aftermath of the global and European financial crisis. Ireland primarily suffered from a 
massive banking crisis, which was especially severe because of the large size of the 
banking system: the balance sheet of Irish-owned banks was 3.7 times GDP in 2007, while 
with international financial centres the ratio was 7.1 times GDP. Early in the crisis, the Irish 
government guaranteed most liabilities of Irish-owned banks—a decision made entirely by 
the Irish authorities. But later, when the problems with the blanket guarantee became clearer 
                                                          
20 See Darvas (2012c). 
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and the issue emerged in political debates, the Irish government wished to restructure the 
banks' senior debt. 
The three institutions had diverging priorities: 
 
 The IMF: restore stability and promote growth in Ireland. 
 Europeans: ensure stability of the euro area (fear from contagion). 
The three institutions had diverging proposals:21 
 The IMF urged imposing losses on senior bank bondholders and estimated that it 
would benefit Ireland by about €16 billion–€17 billion (10 percent of GDP). 
 The ECB expressed its resolute opposition, motivated by the fear from destabilizing 
senior bank bond markets, and more generally a disruption of bank-funding markets 
throughout the euro area. 
Resolution of the dispute: 
 The IMF conceded; senior bank bonds were not restructured. 
 However, the episode left a sense of unfairness against Ireland, which played a big 
role in later enabling a financial restructuring known as the “promissory notes 
transaction,” which was beneficial to Ireland (Véron 2016). 
 
4.4 Disagreement between the International Monetary Fund and European institutions: 
the 2015/2017 Greek example 
Greece held snap elections in January 2015 and the new government rejected the 
implementation of the ongoing second financial assistance programme. After a half-year 
stalemate between the Greek government and the Troika institutions, a third financial 
assistance programme was agreed between the Greek authorities and euro-area partners in 
summer of 2015. The new loan was provided fully by the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), the new permanent safety net of the euro area. The IMF was not among the 
signatories of this third assistance programme because it had a major dispute with European 
partners about Greek debt sustainability, but did not exclude its later participation. By 
February 2017, the time of finalizing this paper, the dispute has not yet been solved and the 
IMF has not yet decided about its participation in the assistance programme.  
Because of the negative associations with the name “Troika” in Greece, this name was 
dropped and instead the IMF, the European Commission, the ECB, and the ESM are called 
“institutions.”  
The four institutions had diverging priorities: 
                                                          
21 See Brennan (2010), Lane (2011), and O’Rourke (2011) for arguments for and against the restructuring of 
senior bank debt. 
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 The IMF: learn from the mistakes of the previous two Greek assistance programmes, 
listen more to the voices of non-European members of the IMF,22 and ensure the 
repayment of existing IMF loans to Greece.  
 Europeans: ensure a consistent implementation of financial assistance programmes 
in the euro area. 
The four institutions had diverging assessments and proposals: 
 The IMF staff concluded that Greece cannot reach a 3.5 percent of GDP primary 
balance target (or if it is reached, it will not be maintained for long) and significantly 
downgraded Greek growth outlook. Therefore, IMF staff concluded that Greek public 
debt is not sustainable. Since the bulk of Greek debt is due to official creditors, the 
IMF proposed to restructure EU loans, but full repayment of IMF loans. 
 Europeans argued that meeting the conditionality of the programme (i.e., structural 
reforms) is more important than giving a debt relief, given that Greece has major 
structural weaknesses but no market borrowing for years. Europeans criticized the 
IMF for overly pessimistic assumptions and argued that certain easing of the debt 
burden can be discussed only after programme conditionality is properly 
implemented.  
Resolution of the dispute: 
 No resolution so far.  
 The IMF has not yet decided about its participation in the third financial assistance 
programme to Greece. 
 
5. Implications for Asia 
While financial assistance for EU countries, and in particular, to euro-area countries, have 
many distinctive features, Asian countries can draw several lessons from the experiences of 
European countries, which can be classified into three main categories: 
 Euro-area countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus), where assistance 
programmes had a number of unique features; 
 Latvia, a country that maintained a fixed exchange rate throughout the assistance 
programme; 
 Hungary and Romania, two countries with floating exchange rate regimes.  
We highlight four key issues: coexistence of global and regional safety nets, their 
cooperation, systemic spillovers across countries, and social implications of assistance 
programmes.  
 
                                                          
22 The IMF received major criticisms from its emerging/developing country members for its earlier handling of the 
euro-area crisis. 
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5.1 Coexistence of the International Monetary Fund and regional safety nets 
A key lesson from the financial assistance programmes to the four euro-area and three non-
euro EU countries is that joint programmes between the IMF and regional safety nets are 
possible and can be successful. As Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, and Wolff (2013) highlight, the US 
and European countries opposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund in the late 1990s, 
which now seems to be unjustified, and an expression of unequal treatment, given that the 
IMF cooperated with European institutions for financial assistance of seven EU countries. 
EU countries were in a special situation, given that they have a strong influence on the Fund: 
the share of EU representatives in the IMF Executive Board is higher than the share of EU 
countries in the combined GDP of all IMF members, and IMF’s managing directors have 
been Europeans so far. A key question for Asian countries therefore is whether the IMF 
would be ready to cooperate with Asian regional institutions to a similar degree as it 
cooperated with European institutions. It is difficult to answer such a question. However, the 
IMF has showed the capacity to change its view toward more pragmatic approaches in many 
issues,23 which suggests that it may not exclude the cooperation with regional safety nets 
from other regions, provided that certain preconditions exist. A key precondition for 
cooperation seems to be that the regional safety net should have a sufficient own capacity to 
partner with the IMF in terms of analysis, advice, and financing. The European experiences 
show that when this is the case, the IMF and regional institutions can work together. A 
possible cooperation between the IMF and regional institutions may also be helpful in 
reducing the “stigma effect,” which has been associated with IMF programmes since the 
Asian financial crises of 1997/98. The cooperation in Europe was burdened with major 
disagreements in the cases of Latvia and Greece, and to a lesser extent Ireland, while 
disagreements were less important in the cases of Hungary, Romania, Ireland, and Cyprus.  
Some of the joint European programmes were more successful (e.g., Ireland, Cyprus), while 
the first two Greek programmes were major failures. Therefore, cooperation between the 
IMF and regional safety nets does not guarantee, nor exclude, success.  
 
5.2 Cooperation between the International Monetary Fund and regional safety nets 
European experiences with jointly funded assistance programmes by the IMF and regional 
institutions suggest that cooperation could be more efficient if there is a prior agreement on 
 how to settle possible disputes between institutions, 
 division of labour between the institutions, 
 information sharing, and 
 synchronized decision making. 
                                                          
23 For example, the IMF and its policies have evolved significantly in post-1997/98 Asian financial crisis and is 
moving beyond a “one size fits all” approach. For example, the IMF (1) recently endorsed capital controls under 
certain conditions, while strongly opposed such controls earlier; (2) conducted extensive research on social 
issues like income inequality, while there was hardly any such research earlier; (3) published several papers on 
fiscal multipliers and entered into a major debate with the European Commission on this issue, by arguing that 
multipliers tend to be large in a recession, which should be considered in the design of fiscal strategies; and (4) 
for Greece, while the IMF wholeheartedly endorsed the 6 percent of GDP primary balance target of the first 
financial assistance program of 2010 and the 4.5 percent of GDP target of the second financial assistance 
program of 2012, since 2015 it argues that even a 3.5 percent target is too ambitious and instead a 1.5 percent 
target would be appropriate. We assess many of these changes as “pragmatic.” 
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Furthermore, the major disputes that emerged in the cases of Latvia and Greece suggest 
that it may be preferable to design the cooperation in a way to allow withdrawal of either the 
IMF or the regional institution in case a major dispute is not solved. Such a design can be 
possible if the remaining party has sufficient financial resources to replace the funding of the 
withdrawing party. This could be the case either with programmes requiring relative small 
amount of funding, or if either the IMF or the regional institution accepts to be a junior 
partner in terms of financing, in which case the junior partner could withdraw its participation 
and funding. 
Another key lesson from Europe, which was also emphasized by the Independent Evaluation 
Office of the IMF (2016), is that the risk of political interference in technical analysis should 
be minimized. Final decisions typically involve political considerations too, but the technical 
work by the staff should be prepared independently of any political influence. 
 
5.3 Better monitoring and assessment of systemic spillovers across countries 
A major source of disagreement between the IMF and European partners was related to the 
different perception of the systemic cross-country implications of certain measures, such as 
the following: 
 the possible impact of a devaluation, or the utilization of the full ±15 percent wide 
exchange rate fluctuation band in Latvia in 2008/2009, for the other two Baltic 
countries; 
 the possible impact of a Greek public debt restructuring in 2010 for other euro-area 
countries with weaker fundamentals; and 
 the possible impact of a restructuring of Irish senior bondholders in 2010/2011 for the 
bank funding markets in the euro area. 
Disagreements arose because of the different methodologies and assessments of these 
cross-country spillovers. In such cases, it seems advisable that technical level experts from 
the IMF and regional institutions discuss thoroughly the reasons for their disagreements and 
submit a joint report to the decision-making bodies of both the IMF and the regional 
institutions in which they clarify the reasons for their disagreement.  
The same advice applies to the assessment of fiscal sustainability, another topic in which 
there were major disagreements between the IMF and European institutions.  
 
5.4 Social impacts of financial assistance programmes 
Last but not least, European cooperation between the IMF and regional safety nets suggests 
that too little attention was paid on the possible social impacts of the programmes. While the 
ultimate goal of returning to robust GDP growth remains crucial, which can also help to ease 
social tensions, programme design should focus on social impacts during the adjustment 
period, including the distribution of the burden.  
For example, even during the relative successful Irish programme, major social problems 
emerged. As Figure 13 of Darvas, Hüttl, De Sousa, Terzi, and Tschekassin (2014) shows, 
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the share of children aged 0–17 living in jobless households increased to the highest value 
in Ireland among the 28 EU member states by 2012, while the share of people aged 18–59 
living in jobless households became the second highest in Ireland, after Greece. 
The social impacts of loan conditionality and the distributional implications of various 
measures should be considered more prominently, which would also increase the ownership 
of the programme. 
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Annex: Gross domestic product and unemployment rate projections versus outcomes 
 
Figure 16: Greece: Gross domestic product and unemployment rate projections 
versus outcomes 
    GDP at constant prices (2007 = 100)            Unemployment Rate (percent) 
  
Note: The vertical lines indicate the year of financial assistance programme negotiations. The brief 
programme documentations issued by the European Commission and the European Stability 
Mechanism in the context of the third programme do not include unemployment rate projections. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) did not participate in the third programme and therefore did not 
issue a detailed standard programme documentation. 
Source: IMF programme documents at the inception of the first two programmes (Table 1 and Table 
A3 from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10110.pdf and Table 3 and Table 9 from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1257.pdf ), Table 1 of first review document published 
by the European Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/pdf/cr_full_to_ewg_en.p
df ); and IMF World Economic Outlook October 2016 for actual data. 
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Figure 17: Ireland: Gross domestic product and unemployment rate projections 
versus outcomes 
    GDP at Constant Prices (2007 = 100)            Unemployment Rate (percent) 
  
Note: The vertical line indicates the year of financial assistance programme negotiations. 
Source: IMF programme document at the inception of the programme (Table 2 of 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10366.pdf ) and IMF World Economic Outlook October 
2016 for actual data. 
 
Figure 18: Portugal: Gross domestic product and unemployment rate projections 
versus outcomes 
    GDP at Constant Prices (2007 = 100)            Unemployment Rate (percent) 
  
Note: The vertical line indicates the year of financial assistance programme negotiations. 
Source: IMF programme document at the inception of the programme (Table 1 of 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11127.pdf ) and IMF World Economic Outlook October 
2016 for actual data. 
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Figure 19: Cyprus: Gross domestic product and unemployment rate projections 
versus outcomes 
    GDP at Constant Prices (2007 = 100)            Unemployment Rate (percent) 
  
Note: The vertical line indicates the year of financial assistance programme negotiations. 
Source: IMF programme document at the inception of the programme (Table 1 of 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13125.pdf ) and IMF World Economic Outlook October 
2016 for actual data. 
 
Figure 20: Hungary: Gross domestic product and unemployment rate projections 
versus outcomes 
    GDP at constant prices (2007 = 100)            Unemployment rate (percent) 
  
Note: The vertical line indicates the year of financial assistance programme negotiations. 
Source: IMF programme document at the inception of the programme (Table 3 of 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08361.pdf ) and IMF World Economic Outlook October 
2016 for actual data. 
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Figure 21: Latvia: Gross domestic product and unemployment rate projections versus 
outcomes 
    GDP at constant prices (2007 = 100)            Unemployment rate (percent) 
  
Note: The vertical line indicates the year of financial assistance programme negotiations. 
Source: IMF programme document at the inception of the programme (Table 8 of 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr0903.pdf ) and IMF World Economic Outlook October 
2016 for actual data. 
 
Figure 22: Romania: Gross domestic product and unemployment rate projections 
versus outcomes 
    GDP at constant prices (2007 = 100)            Unemployment rate (percent) 
  
Note: The vertical line indicates the year of financial assistance programme negotiations. 
Source: IMF programme document at the inception of the programme (Table 1 of 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09183.pdf ) and IMF World Economic Outlook October 
2016 for actual data. 
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Figure 23: Germany: Gross domestic product and unemployment rate 2010 October 
projections versus outcomes 
    GDP at constant prices (2007 = 100)            Unemployment rate (percent) 
  
Note: The vertical line indicates 2010, the year from which we used IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) projections. Note that historical data were also revised and the total growth from 2009 to 2015 
was almost the same (12.6 percent) as the October 2010 IMF projection (12.8 percent).  
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook October 2010 and October 2016.   
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